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Of my many fond personal memories of Gary Schwartz, the one that stands out 
most vividly summons from the mists of time an evening in June 1983 at Boston's 
Fenway Park. It was my last visit to a childhood haunt where I had seen my first 
professional baseball game in 1941, an occasion that marked the beginning of a life-
long passion for the national pastime. Settled into an excellent seat that faced the 
storied left-field wall (and brought to mind visions of the large advertisements that 
covered its surface before it became known as the "Green Monster',I), I began to 
lose myself in the contest that was leisurely unfolding. But I hadn't counted on my 
two companions, Gary Schwartz and David Owen, who in about the second inning 
launched into a perfervid, nonstop discussion of some problematic issue raised by 
the California Supreme Court's holding in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.2 I found 
myself engrossed by their earnest give-and-take and soonrendered totally oblivious 
to how the Red Sox were faring. It was then I truly realized how much of an 
academic I had become. 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. I can recall large pictures promoting Gem razor blades and Lifebuoy soap. In 1947 the 
advertisements came down and the wall became a green monolith, except for the scoreboard. See 
PHILIP J. LOWRY, GREEN CATIlEDRALS 23 (1992). When and how the expression "Green Monster" 
originated remains a mystery. See DAN SHAUGHNESSY & STAN GROSSFELD, FENWAY: A BIOGRAPHY 
lNWORDSANDPICTIJRES 101 (1999). 
This footnote is dedicated to the baseball fan in Gary, who was a life-long Cleveland Indians' 
enthusiast and a Los Angeles Dodgers season-ticket-holder. 
2. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
797 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The untimely loss of Gary Schwartz at a moment in time when he was serving 
as Reporter for the new Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm 
(Basic Prinicples) and standing poised to deliver what undoubtedly would have 
been his crowning achievement as a torts scholar is an immeasurably grievous one, 
both for the field in which he toiled and for the learned community he graced with 
singular distinction. We can only speculate about how he might have shaped the 
direction oftort law in the twenty-first century, had he been able to complete the 
project.3 
Although Gary first drew the attention of torts mavens with an article re-
assessing the doctrines of contributory and comparative fault,4 it was his lucent 
analysis of Barker in the California Law ReviewS that signaled his particular 
fascination with the products liability precinct of personal injury law. That interest 
maintained a grip on him and sparked a series of scholarly works that constitute a 
unique contribution to our understanding of the complexities and conundrums 
conjured up by the theories, doctrines, and rules imposing liability on manufacturers 
and sellers for the harm caused by their products.6 In addition, some of his articles 
on nonproducts topics occasionally touched on manufacturers' liability.? 
3. What we do know is that he engaged a segment of the torts academy in the beginnings of a 
spirited conversation provoked by his draft of basic principles dealing with negligence law-to the 
extent that an entire (and fat) issue of a law review devoted itself to reactions to the draft. See 
Symposium, The John W. Wade Conference on the Third Restatement of Torts, 54 V AND. L. REv. 639 
(2001). 
4. See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE 
U. 697 (1978). 
5. Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv.435 (1979) 
[hereinafter Understanding]. 
6. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products Liability Scholarship, 14 
J. LEGAL STUD. 763 (1985) [hereinafter Directions]; Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto 
Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1013 (1991) [hereinafter Myth]; Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old 
Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 796 (1983) [hereinafter New Products]. 
Gary also served as an Adviser to the Reporters of the new Products Liability Restatement. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrS LIABILITY (1998) [hereinafter PRODUcrS LIABILITY 
RESTATEMENT]. 
7. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern American 
Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 653-56 (1992) [hereinafter Beginning] (discussing judicial rejections 
of certain forms of strict liability in products cases); Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment 
in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 133, 150-52 (1982) 
[hereinafter Deterrence] (analyzing the appropriateness of awarding of exemplary damages against 
manufacturers who made product-design decisions on the basis of cost-benefit calculations); Gary T. 
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. 
REv. 377, 405-13 (1994) (discussing how well product liability law deters the marketing of defective 
products). 
Even his first article, which dealt with an aspect of municipal-government law, analyzed a 
provocative products liability issue. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private 
Law Exception, 20 UCLA L. REv. 671, 728 (1973) (discussing whether a California city ordinance 
could abrogate the rule of strict tort liability the state supreme court had adopted in suits against 
manufacturers for harm caused by defective products). 
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A rereading of Gary's products-liability scholarship inspires a renewed 
appreciation of the special qualities he brought to it. Analytical rigor stood as the 
hallmark of his approach to the scholarly enterprise and reflected an abiding faith 
in the value, force, and efficacy of reason. At the same time, he leavened his work 
with a generous dose of fair-mindedness as well as large dollops of commonsense 
and a refreshing awareness of the real-world implications of the ideas with which 
he dealt-the latter a characteristic not often demonstrated by many of his peers in 
the academy. 
In a scholarly era marked for some time by the predominance of theory, Gary 
brought a bracinglynondoctrinaire outlook to his intellectual pursuits. He belonged 
to neither the efficiency nor the corrective-justice "churches" that have dominated 
theoretical writing in the torts field,8 but instead he opted, inter alia, to perform the 
eminently useful function of explaining to nonbelievers the dogmas, doctrines, and 
teachings central to both, and, even more importantly, to subj ect them to the critical 
perspective of an intellectually curious outsider.9 
This Article will examine three of Gary's major articles dealing with products 
liability and point out how they exemplify the unique features of his scholarship. 
First, it will consider the noteworthy aspects of his early piece on Barker. Second, 
it will consider his treatment of the controversial matter of products liability reform 
at the federal level. And third, it will examine Gary's interpretation of the famous 
Ford Pinto case. In tribute to Gary's high standards of scholarship, I shall offer an 
occasional criticism, which I am certain he would have welcomed (and which he 
would either have agreed with or responded to vigorously, in his customarily 
thoughtful way). 
II. GARY SCHWARTZ ON BARKER 
The California Supreme Court has always been on the cutting edge of the 
development of products liability doctrine. Landmark decisions of the court ranged 
from Justice Traynor's famous concurring opinion advocating what he termed the 
"absolute liability" of manufacturers of defective productsIO to the first judicial 
decision adopting a general rule of strict tort liability for harm resulting from 
8. In assessing the entire range of products liability scholarship, Gary identified doctrine, 
history, and empiricism as alternatives to efficiency and corrective justice as foci of academic concern. 
See Directions, supra note 6, at 763. Several of his own articles traced the historical development of 
certain tort doctrines. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA 
L. REv. 641 (1989); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: 
A Reinterpretation, 90 YALEL.J. 1717 (1981). However, one cannot accurately characterize him as 
a law-and-history person because his concerns ranged far beyond the bounds ofIegal history. 
9. Indeed, one of his most useful and interesting pieces begins work on a bridge over the 
yawning chasm that separates the two schools (whose adherents rarely address one another), and 
attempts to develop what he called a "mixed theory" of tort law, under which "tort law imposes or 
assigns liability for proper deterrence reasons-unless this result is not compatible with the criterion 
of corrective justice." Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1801, 1824 (1997). 
10. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
HeinOnline -- 53 S. C. L. Rev. 800 2001-2002
800 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:797 
products flaws, II and from the approval of the use of comparative negligence as a 
defense to strict products liabilityl2 to the creation of a rule of market share liability 
for manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals.13 Although not all of its innovative 
holdings have commanded universal or even widespread approval,14 the opinions 
of the California court have consistently generated ideas with which not only other 
jurisdictions but also scholarly commentators have found it necessary to reckon. IS 
Barker was one of these seminal moments in the history of California's 
contribution to products liability law, with its path-breaking adoption of the 
consumer-expectations and risk-utility approaches as alternative methods of 
establishing defective design, and with a reversal of the traditional burden of proof 
when plaintiff opts to use the risk-utility test. 16 The opinion also suggested, in 
dictum, that the risks to be considered in applying risk-utility should be determined 
on the basis of hindsight rather than foresight,17 and that under certain 
circumstances manufacturers might be liable for harm caused by defect-free, highly 
dangerous products. IS 
Gary's analysis of Barker quickly became "must reading" as the best available 
introduction to some of the most troublesome issues in products liability 
jurisprudence. Because his goal was to demonstrate the full sweep of the opinion, 
he did not purport to exhaust all its implications. However, he did succeed in 
identifying both the original and the problematic aspects of the decision, and 
providing an analytical frame of reference and point of departure for others. 
His tour de force began with a history of the development of California 
products liability law and the snag produced by Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 19 
which rejected the concept of unreasonable danger as a test for determining when 
a product is defective and thereby seemed to leave lower courts without any 
workable standard for jurors to apply in strict-liability design and warnings cases.20 
It was this problem that the court sought to solve in Barker.21 
He then put forward the concept of what he called "genuine strict liability," 
which would hold manufacturers strictly liable for all harms associated with their 
products, whether or not they were defective.22 The Barker court did not consider 
11. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
12. Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978). 
13. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
14. See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324,344-45 (Ill. 1990) (rejecting the theory 
of market share liability); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 361 (Kan. 1982) (rejecting the 
two-pronged Barker test); Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d 373, 380 (Ohio 1987) (rejecting Daly). 
15. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product 
Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773 (1979) 
(criticizing Barker). 
16. Barker, 573 P. 2d at 452. 
17. ld. at 454. 
18. ld. at 455 n.10. 
19. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972). 
20. ld. at 1163. 
21. Barker, 573 P.2d at 446. 
22. See Understanding, supra note 5, at 441-48. 
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this as an option, but Gary deemed it worth examining as a road not taken and a 
prelude to a discussion of what the court actually did. Others have called this 
concept enterprise liability,23 which ideally would provide incentives for 
manufacturers to take all cost-justified risk-reduction measures and to spread, 
through insurance and price adjustments, the costs of harm not reasonably worth 
preventing.24 In rejecting the ,visdom and feasibility of this approach, Gary pointed 
out its shortcomings, such as the unfairness in holding a manufacturer of a non-
defective product liable to someone whose negligence or recklessness contributed 
to the resulting injuries, and the possibility of multiple causative factors that would 
severely complicate the achievement of sensible loss spreading,2S which help 
explain why no court has yet to adopt the theory.26 
Gary then examined the roots of strict products liability, and located them in 
both tort and contract doctrine.27 His basic point was that the shift to strict tort in the 
1960s and 1970s was not really a radical departure from prior law, since most 
manufacturing flaws probably resulted from some negligence on the part of the 
manufacturer, but the injured plaintiff might not be able to prove this in every 
instance; hence, strict tort created a de facto irrebuttable presumption of culpability 
on the'manufacturer's part. Moreover, the way most courts determined liability for 
design and marketing defects was virtually indistinguishable from how they would 
go about deciding whether a manufacturer was negligent.28 One detects a slight 
23. See, e.g., Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory oJTorts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 
153, 158 (1976). For an application of the theory of enterprise liability to the products liability field, 
see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived CaseJor Enterprise 
Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683 (1993). 
24. See Understandings, supra note 5, at 443. 
25. Id. at 444-48. He might also have mentioned the difficulty of creating a workable system of 
enterprise liability decisionally through the adjudicative process. 
Gary reiterated his disapproval of the concept of genuine strict liability on several later 
occasions. See, e.g., New Products, supra note 6, at 809. 
26. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, 
UNDERSTANDING ENIERPRISELIABILITY: REnliNKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY -FIRST CENTURY 
(1995). 
Although no jurisdiction has explicitly endorsed the theory, it is plausible to view strict liability 
in tort for manufacturing defects as a limited form of enterprise liability, applicable only to one kind 
of product flaw, since it seeks to accomplish deterrence and cost-spreading goals in the same way 
these aims would be pursued under enterprise liability. 
27. See Understanding, supra note 5, at 448-64. 
28. In holding to these views, Gary would later take strong issue with the claim made by one 
torts scholar to the effect that modem products liability law had already actually become a system of 
enterprise liability, subjecting manufacturers to a form of absolute liability. See Beginning, supra note 
7, at 624-28 (discussing George L. Priest, The Invention oJEnterprise Liability: A Critical History 
oJthe Intellectual Foundations oj Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985». Priest had 
asserted that "[T]he contours of modem tort law reflect a single coherent conception of the best 
method to control the sources of product-related injuries. This conception ... provides in its simplest 
form that business enterprises ought to be responsible for losses resulting from products they 
introduce into commerce." Priest, supra, at463. Gary's criticisms lent force to the conclusion that this 
notion conflated the theory animating early proponents of strict products liability with the actual 
development of the case law. 
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ambivalence in Gary's thinking here, because although he acknowledged the 
contributions of contract law, with its focus on the relationship between seller and 
purchaser, he remained a tort person at heart and never wavered from his conviction 
that products liability belonged exclusively within the embrace of tort law.29 
Next, he discussed the two prongs of the Barker test for design defects.30 His 
clear preference was for its risk-benefit approach, although he expressed some 
misgivings about the California court's innovative shifting of the burden of proof 
to manufacturers to show that the benefits of the design they chose outweighed the 
costs of any alternative design.31 Here, he stressed the practical point, fortified by 
a report of conversations with victims' trial attorneys,32 that from a tactical 
perspective lawyers representing injured claimants will prefer to present evidence 
of a feasible alternative that defendant could have adopted at a reasonable cost, in 
order to seize the initiative in putting before the jury a powerful story that would 
advantage their clients.33 He did not, however, take an unequivocal position on 
whether courts should require plaintiffs to present, as a sine qua non element in 
every design-defect case, evidence of a reasonable alternative design/4 an issue that 
has generated substantial controversy in recent years.35 
Gary ended up by endorsing a very practical compromise that would permit 
burden-of-proof shifting once plaintiff had put forward some evidence of an 
alternative design; in his view the burden of proof should then shift to defendant to 
29. See New Products, supra note 6, at 811 ("It is time that product liability be integrated into 
the mainstream of tort, rather than treated as some exotic or super-modem specialty."). 
30. See Understanding, supra note 5, at 464. 
31. See id. at 468. 
32. For further discussion of Gary's use ofinforrnation and insights gleaned from the world of 
practical experience, see infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text. 
33. See Understanding, supra note 5, at 469. 
34. His statement that "one simply cannot talk meaningfully about a risk-benefit defect in a 
product design until and unless one has identified some design alternative (including any design 
omission) that can serve as the benefit for risk-benefit analysis" suggests that in some situations 
plaintiff might make out a prima facie case of defective design merely by alleging that defendant 
should not have utilized some particular design feature-for example sharp protrusions on automobile 
hubcaps.Id. at 468. See Passwaters v. Gen. Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding 
vehicle manufacturer might be liable to motorcycle passenger whose leg became caught in protrusions 
extending from hubcap of a passing automobile). Of course, the product without the umeasonably 
dangerous design feature could qualify conceptually as an alternative design. 
Gary did not consider whether there might be some products whose designs are so obviously 
dangerous in the extreme that it would serve no useful purpose to compel plaintiffs to present evidence 
of an alternative design. See, e.g., Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956) (concerning 
a lawn chair that folded in such a way as to act as a guillotine and cut off the finger of a consumer who 
grasped it in the wrong way). 
35. The new Products Liability Restatement requires proof of a reasonable alternative design 
in a black-letter provision. See PRODUCTS LIABIUTI RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 2(b). For 
criticisms, see for example, Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1407 (1994); John 
F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for 
Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 
26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493 (1996). For the Reporters' response, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron 
D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORN. L. REv. 867 (1998). 
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explain why plaintiff's alternative was or should have beenrejected.36 The fact that 
manufacturers have access to the type of information that might make clear the 
undesirability of a specific design option would eliminate unfairness concerns, and 
the willingness of trial courts to direct verdicts when the evidence offered by 
manufacturers overpowers plaintiff's claim would make this approach sensible and 
workable. 
Gary also expressed serious reservations about the consumer expectation test, 
because of what in his judgment were insurmountable practical difficulties in 
applying the standard in design cases.37 He did recognize that some product-related 
injuries might be traceable to a product's failure to perform as expected-the result 
of some shortcoming in design.38 Here Gary was ahead of his time in suggesting 
a different way oflooking at the universe of product defects.39 However, he viewed 
such performance defects as evidenced by the fact that the product did not function 
as similar products (a sort of departure from industry custom) rather than as 
indicated by the fact that the product frustrated the reasonable expectations of 
consumers.40 
36. See Understanding, supra note 5, at 470-71. Gary had discovered, from conversations with 
practitioners, that California trial judges had been using this approach before Barker. [d. The latter 
holding did not require plaintiffs to offer proof of a reasonable alternative design, but merely obliged 
plaintiffs to prove that the product's design caused the injury. The California Supreme Court later 
refused to overrule that portion of Barker placing on manufacturers the burden of proof on the risk-
utility prong decision. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 304 (Cal. 1994). 
37. See Understanding, supra note 5, at 472-81. In one provocative footnote, he presented the 
argument that if a manufacturer's portrayal of a product was such as to generate and frustrate specific 
consumer expectations of safety, this would for all intents and purposes amount to a breach of express 
warranty or an innocent misrepresentation, for which consumers could recover under theories other 
than strict liability for defective design. [d. at 476 n.241. 
However, to make out a prima facie case for breach of express warranty or innocent 
misrepresentation in tort, plaintiff would have to establish her detrimental reliance. See 1 DAVID G. 
OWEN,M.STUARTMADDEN&MARYJ.DAVIs,MADDEN&OWENONPRODUcrsLIABILITY § 4:2, at 128 
(3rd ed. 2000) [hereinafter MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY] (stating that under express 
warranty plaintiff presumed to have relied on representation that became basis of bargain, whereas 
under innocent misrepresentation she must show actual reliance). Courts applying the consumer 
expectations test in design-defect cases have imposed on plaintiffs no equivalent requirement. 
38. See Understanding, supra note 5, at 465. 
39. The generally accepted tripartite categorization of products liability cases di¥ides them into 
claims involving manufacturing flaws, design flaws, and inadequate warnings or instructions for use. 
See W. PAGE KEETONET AL., PROSSER AND KEEToN ON THE LAW ON TORTS § 99, at 695-702 (5th ed. 
1984). One could consider performance defects as overlapping manufacturing and design flaws, or 
as falling into a separate category, where the actual cause of the malfunction is irrelevant and it is the 
malfunction itself that qualifies as the defect. 
40. This provides further evidence of Gary's conviction that products liability doctrine should 
be located squarely within the four comers of tort law. 
The Products Liability Restatement would permit courts to draw an inference that a product was 
defective in manufacture or design when the incident that caused the harm "was of a kind that 
ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect." PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, 
§ 3(a). Comment b points out that the rule here is "limited to situations in which a product fails to 
perform its manifestly intended function." Id. at § 3 cmt. b. Quaere whether plaintiffs might prove 
a manifestly intended function by establishingjustifiable consumer expectations, which would thereby 
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The Barker dictum, to the effect that courts applying the risk-benefit prong 
should do so with the benefit of hindsight rather from the perspective of foresight, 
attracted some thoughtful attention from Gary. He pointed out that a court might use 
hindsight to determine what risks the manufacturer should have taken into account 
in designing the product or in deciding what warnings and instructions for use 
should accompany the product, and also to determine the technology the 
manufacturer should have incorporated into the product to make it reasonably 
safe.41 In the latter cases, which raise the state-of-the-art issue, he argued 
convincingly that a hindsight approach would be inappropriate, from the 
perspectives of both efficiency and corrective justice.42 However, he did express 
approval of the use of hindsight in assessing the risk side of the risk-benefit balance, 
which means that manufacturers could be charged with an awareness of risks 
known at the time of trial, even though the latter might have been unknown or 
unknowable when the product was designed or the warnings and instructions for 
use conveyed.43 Because in most cases manufacturers probably had some inkling 
of the existence of a risk and it might be very difficult for product victims to prove 
this, he concluded that a hindsight knowledge-of-risk test might be appropriate.44 
Thus, once again he linked strict liability to what he felt were its negligence origins, 
here manifested by the recognition of a kind of irrebuttable presumption that 
manufacturers are aware of all risks associated with their products, and therefore 
might be liable, under the risk-utility test, for failing to design out the dangers or to 
warn against them. Although the negative reaction generated by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court when it adopted the hindsight test45 and the subsequent rejection of 
the test in California46 and in the Products Liability Restatement7 (as well as in 
be reinvigorated as an independent measure of defectiveness. For discussions of the meaning of § 3, 
see Sheila L. Birnbaum, Traditional Restatement or Harbinger of Policy Changes?, 8 !<AN. J. L. & 
PUB. POL'y 47, 48-49 (1998); Harvey S. Perlman, Section 3's Circumstantial Evidence Rule: Can It 
Cure the Defects in Section 2?, 8 !<AN. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 99 (1998); Bill Wagner, Help for "The 
Other Side." 8 !<AN. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 95,96 (1998). 
41. See Understanding, supra note 5, at 482. 
42. A hindsight test would not promote deterrence, since manufacturers could not possibly 
incorporate undiscovered, unavailable technology into their products, and imposing liability for failing 
to do the "undo-able" would probably run counter to the community's sense offaimess. See id. at 483-
84. 
43. His precise language is that in cases involving unknowable risks "on balance a hindsight 
approach is probably sensible." Id. at 488. It would seem to follow that hindsight should also be used 
when the existence of a risk was known at the time of manufacture, but the true extent of the risk did 
not become knowable until some time later. 
44. See id. at 486-88. 
45. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). For critical 
responses to the decisions, see for example, John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of 
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 754-56 (1983) and William R. 
Murray, Jr., Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable 
Product Defects, 71 GEO. L.J. 1635 (1983). 
46. See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991). 
47. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §2 (b)-(c). 
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New Jersey itself'S) have dealt severe blows to the looking-backward approach, a 
recent decision from the Wisconsin Supreme Court suggests that reports of its 
demise may have been premature.49 
The final aspect of Barker to draw Gary's attention was the "norm-of-danger" 
dictum indicating that a manufacturer might be liable for harm caused by a 
product's lrnown risks, even though no alternative design was feasible, if the 
dangers were substantial.5o Here, Gary drew a comparison with the doctrine of strict 
tort liability for ultrahazardous activities, and he argued that a cause of action 
against the user of an ultrahazardous product would be more appropriate than a suit 
based on strict tort liability against the manufacturer of the product. 51 This might 
take care of third parties injured by an abnormally dangerous product. With respect 
to injured users, he posited that it would not be unfair to deny recovery to plaintiffs 
who chose to expose themselves to an inherently risky product with full 
appreciation of its substantial danger.52 
Gary's discussion here touched only faintly on the possibility that a non-
defective but very dangerous product might also have very low (or no) social 
utility. 53 Therefore, he did not give careful consideration to the extent to which 
process concerns might cut against the judicial imposition of liability for marketing 
a highly risky product that contributed little or nothing to the good of society. 54 A 
spirited controversy over whether courts should have be able to impose liability on 
the manufacturers of such products for harm caused by their inherent dangers broke 
out during the drafting of the Products Liability Restatement,55 which in its final 
form left the door slightly ajar for the possibility of recovery for harm caused by 
48. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374,388 (N.J. 1984). Although the New Jersey 
Supreme Court pretended that Feldman did not overrule Beshada, a fair reading of the case suggests 
that it marked the quickest "turn around" in the histOlY of products liability law. 
49. See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 750-51 (Wis. 20Ql) (holding 
that latex gloves might be found defective and unreasonably dangerous even though at time they were 
marketed the manufacturer could not have known of the risks of harm they generated). 
50. Barker, 573 P.2d at 455 n.l0. 
51. See Understanding, supra note 5, at 490-91. 
52. See id. at 491. 
53. See id. at 491 n.308. 
54. In a subsequent article, Gary adverted to this very briefly, when he noted that it might 
"extend the risk-benefit idea well beyond its institutional breaking-point to allow individual juries to 
consider whether entire genres of products-cigarettes, handguns, auto converiibles-should be 
regarded as deficient under risk-benefit reasoning." Beginning, supra note 7, at 684. However, he 
continued to focus on dangerous products that have more than minimal social utility at best, and he 
did not consider whether there might be any principled way for courts to impose liability on the 
manufacturers of products of highly dubious social value. 
55. See Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to Jury Trial in 
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1043, 1096-98 
(1994); Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative 
Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1429, 1434-54 (1994); see also 
Symposium, Generic Products Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3 (1996). 
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generic product risks.56 
Gary's analysis of Barker reflected the thoroughness with which he approached 
doctrinal questions and his skill at teasing out their implications. His approach to 
scholarship embodied reasoned elaboration, made even more effective by the 
elegance and directness of his writing style. Next, I shall consider how he combined 
these skills with an abiding fair-mindedness when he confronted controversial 
issues. 
III. GARY SCHWARTZ AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORM 
One of Gary's most attractive traits was his ability to maintain a remarkable 
evenhandedness when he grappled with disputed subjects. This gave his work the 
mark of a scholar in the traditional and best sense of the term. Of course, he did not 
hesitate to reach carefully thought out conclusions. However, before doing so, he 
thoroughly examined all sides of the matter with dispassion, clarity, and logic, 
qualities that elevated the level of debate and merited the respect of those with 
whom he disagreed. 
To demonstrate this point, I should like to take as paradigmatic an article Gary 
wrote on the role federal statutory and decisional law might properly play in the 
realm of torts. 57 More specifically, I shall focus on what he had to say about the "hot 
topic" of federal intervention in the area of products liability,58 initiatives called 
"reform" by advocates59 and "deform" by opponents.60 Putting aside consideration 
of the substantive strengths or weaknesses of various proposals that would have 
federalized aspects of products liability law, Gary chose instead to examine a 
threshold and perhaps more difficult question, the wisdom of nationalizing a field 
oflaw that had traditionally been the province of the states.61 
56. See PRODUcrS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §2 cmt. e (considering the 
hypothetical case of toy gun that shoots hard rubber pellets; court might "declare the product design 
to be defective and not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of danger posed by its use 
or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable 
person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use, or allow children to use, the product"). 
57. Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIz. L. 
REv. 917 (1996) [hereinafter Federal Role]. The article examined proposals to federalize both 
malpractice and products liability law, but the latter occupied the bulk of the author's attention. 
For a nonproduct-related example of Gary's willingness to deal forthrightly with controversial 
issues, see Gary T. Schwartz, Feminist Approaches to Tort Law, in 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 
175 (2001) (criticizing theories of feminist tort scholars). 
58. For a sampling of articles demonstrating the controversial nature of the subject, see Tort 
Reform Symposium Issue, 64 DEN. L. REv. 613 (1988). 
59. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The Road to Federal Product Liability 
Reform, 55 MD. L. REv. 1363 (1996). 
60. See RAPLH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE 
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 259 (1996) (attacking the "tort deform movement" undertaken 
by "corporations and politicians beholden to corporate interests"). 
61. One of the telling points he made in launChing his analysis was that the idea of enacting a 
federal products liability statute gained serious momentum at a time when its backers (mostly 
Republicans and members of the business community) were otherwise intent on rolling back existing 
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Gary identified two major problems with the current system: non-uniformity 
and structural bias. Most manufacturers mass-produce their goods and market them 
nationally, yet may be subject to tort law that varies from state to state.62 This can 
make it difficult, if not impossible, to comply with divergent rules, a situation that 
casts serious doubt on the amount of deterrence these conflicting rules can 
achieve.63 Gary also articulated doubts about one of the supposed advantages of 
federalism, the virtue of experimentation by various states as they test out various 
rules and doctrines.64 
The structures of federalism might also create distortions in the development 
and application of products liability law. What has been termed structural bias 
might encourage state lawmakers to take positions that favor state rather than 
national interests, a notion that has led some to conclude that judges and lawmakers 
support the rights of in-state victims of product-related accidents rather than out-of-
state manufacturers doing business on a national level. 65 
Gary's response was to suggest that this application of the notion of structural 
bias might reflect the triumph of theory over reality. First of all, he discounted as 
evidence of this phenomenon an opinion of the West Virginia Supreme Court 
stating in dictum that in certain kinds of products cases, where a split of authority 
exists ,vith respect to a rule the court might apply, it should always choose the rule 
federal programs and letting states perform functions that had previously been handled at the federal 
level. On the other hand, opponents offederal products liability bills vigorously defended leaving the 
development oftort law to the states. Federal Role, supra note 57, at 918. 
Gary went on to charge both sides with raising or lowering the flag of federalism strategically, 
depending on how they felt about the merits of specific proposals to federalize.ld. at 919. Although 
Gary provided contemporary examples of behavior indicating inconsistency on the part of pro-
defendant tort reformers, he had to strain to paint pro-plaintiff advocates with the same brush. Id. at 
918. Thus, he speculated that they would have supported the 1908 Federal Employers Liability Act, 
which federalized the tort duties owed by railroads to their employees, and that they might have 
backed attempts to insert into the Traffic Safety Act a provision (which was in fact never put forward) 
expanding tort liability. Id. at 920. In fact, the only section of the Traffic Safety Act directly affecting 
civil liability sought to preserve state common law as it governed suits against vehicle manufacturers. 
See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 108(c), 80 Stat 
718,723 (codified as amended at 15U.S.C. §1397(k)(1988 &Supp.m 1991), recodified as 15U.S.C. 
§ 108(k)(1994)). See 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)(1988). Had he cited recent and actualinstances to buttress 
his argument, it would have carried more bite. (Of course, it is arguable that the decisions of pro-
plaintiff people not to push for selective federalization oftort law that might benefit accident victims 
derived from an appreciation of politi cal reality rather than from principled preference.). 
62. As an example, Gary mentioned design-liability claims brought against manufacturers of 
cigarette lighters on behalf of children injured because the product did not have child-resistant 
features. In some of the states where these claims were brought the courts used the risk-utility test for 
design defects, while in others the consumer expectations test governed. See Federal Role, supra note 
57, at 928-29. 
63. There is another aspect to the nonuniformity problem, the possibility that juries in different 
states might render different results, even though they apply the same rules or standards. 
64. See Federal Role, supra note 57, at 930. Gary's main point here was that in the area of 
products liability the states have had several decades to experiment and had already produced 
whatever results the experimentation process might have been capable of producing. 
65. See id. at 933. 
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more favorable to plaintiffs.66 On the other hand, he conceded that an argument 
could be made that state judges might, subconsciously or otherwise, tilt in favor of 
expanding the rights of product victims, because even though they might consider 
the public interest to a greater extent than state legislators, they still might "devalue 
manufacturer's arguments that the proposed expansion would treat manufacturers 
unfairly or would impose excessive costs on manufacturers.,,67 
His final point was that state legislators might respond more readily to 
pressures from defense-oriented groups located both within and outside the state. 
Consumers and others put at risk by defective products are unlikely to compete 
effectively in the legislative arena with pro-defense groups, which are able to raise 
substantial sums and launch highly coordinated lobbying efforts.68 Here Gary made 
the powerful observation that if it is true, as many have argued,69 that consumers 
habitually underestimate the risks associated with products, they are equally likely 
to undervalue the benefits they might gain from pro-victim legislative activity, and 
will therefore give inadequate credit and rewards to legislators who defend their 
right to recover for product-related harm. The fact that most legislative tort reform 
at the state level favors defendants70 provides eloquent testimony about the way 
structural bias works in practice. 
Gary then examined a number of suggested choice-of-Iaw proposals that might 
solve the problem of nonuniformity. They included letting manufacturers designate 
the state law that will govern products liability claims against them, applying the 
state law where the product was first sold, and letting Congress specify a choice-of-
law rule that would require courts to apply the state law where a manufacturer has 
the greatest number of employees.71 He found them all wanting, mainly because 
they would create incentives for states to downplay safety and health concerns and 
66. Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 786 CW.Va. 1991). Gary's criticism of 
the dictum's author, Justice Richard Neely, was characteristically both gentle and cutting. He noted 
that the opinion offered no basis for its negative view of state decisional law in the area of products 
liability, and suggested that Justice Neely was actually issuing an invitation to the United States 
Supreme Court to reverse the decision for violating the Constitution's Commerce Qause. See Federal 
Role, supra note 57, at 934. 
67. Federal Role, supra note 57, at 935. Gary did not mention here the trend in state decisional 
law, beginning in the 1980s and undercutting this supposition, against the expansion of the rights of 
product victims. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in 
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLAL. REv. 479 (1990). The omission 
is curious, since Gary had previously written about the subject See Beginning, supra note 7, at 603-
04. 
68. Gary might have considered the roles and evaluated the influence of the plaintiffs' bar and 
pro-victim public-interest groups, which offer organized opposition to defense-oriented tort reform. 
69. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 lIARv. L. REv. 1420, 1572 (1999) ("[A]ll the evidence of 
consumer product market suggests that this manipUlation [by manufacturers] has been successful and 
will continue to be so until policymakers take and behaviorlism as seriously as marketers do."). 
70. See Beginning, supra note 7, at 681-82; see also I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY, supra note 37, §1:7, at 25 (noting that defense-oriented groups are the "principal 
proponents of ... tort reform"). 
71. See Federal Role, supra note 53, at 937-41. 
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adopt products liability laws that would favor manufacturers. 
Having established the existence of a nonuniformity problem and willing to 
concede the possible presence of structural bias, Gary considered whether and how 
a federal statute might address them.72 He put forward three alternatives and 
concluded that none of them successfully responded to the concerns he had 
identified. First, Congress might see fit to enact a comprehensive statute completely 
nationalizing all aspects of products liability law.73 This would create nettlesome 
inconsistencies in cases where plaintiffs sue manufacturers and third parties not 
covered by the act, and judges have to apply different rules to each set of 
defendants. Gary also questioned whether federal legislators would be better than 
state judges when it came to taking into account tort policy. 74 Finally, he pointed out 
complications that might arise when courts had to construe ambiguous provisions 
in a federal products bill.7s 
Second, Congress might pass a statute adopting federal substantive rules only 
for certain aspects of products liability law and allowing state law to govern issues 
not addressed by the act.16 This would raise harmonization problems similar to those 
that the first alternative would create, and additional concerns as well, since judges 
might have to apply both federal and state law to the claims asserted by plaintiffs 
against manufacturers or sellers.77 . 
The third alternative would be a statute federalizing products liability law in 
principle, but leaving to the state and federal courts the task of developing its 
substance. They would do this by creating a new federal common law to govern 
products cases. This would create the type of harmonization difficulties associated 
with his first alternative, and in addition would place a considerable burden on the 
United States Supreme Court, which has a heavy enough agenda without being 
assigned responsibility for having the final word on disputed products liability 
issues. 
72. See id. at 941-46. 
73. None of the bills introduced in Congress during the 1980s and 1990s purported to federalize 
the entire field of products liability law. (The bill that came closest, H.R. 7000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1980) incorporated most but not all of the Department of Commerce's Model Uniform Product 
Liability Act See 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (Oct 31,1979)). Such an initiative would have invariably left 
gaps that the courts would have to fill, by giving effect to the broad purposes underlying the federal 
statute. This would require the judiciary to engage in the type of interstitial lawmaking called for, to 
a much greater extent, by the third of Gary's alternatives. 
74. Here he cited his own personal experience to support his sense that state judges do a better 
job. See Federal Role, supra note 53, at 942-43 & n.160. 
75. Gary noted that the political compromises that would inevitably occur in the drafting of a 
federal bill would produce numerous "awkward and ambiguous provisions," and court decisions 
interpreting these provisions might produce conflicting constructions. See id. at 943-44. 
76. This is the approach Congress actually took during the two decades it seriously considered 
products liability reform. See, e.g., S. 2631, 97th Cong. (1982). 
77. Gary did not consider the possibility that, if a federal products statute is sufficiently 
minimalist, it will not raise these difficulties. See, e.g., General Aviation Revitalization Act, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40101 (1994) (providing an eighteen-year statute of repose for general aviation aircraft and 
component parts). 
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All in all, Gary brilliantly succeeded in clarifying the intractability of federal 
products liability refonn, which on the one hand seemed necessary in order to create 
uniformity in the legal rules and principles governing national product 
manufacturers and sellers, but on the other hand seemed impossible to achieve 
because of basic structural shortcomings in the processes of lawmaking and law 
application at the federal level. He expresses guarded hope that the new Products 
Liability Restatement might achieve some degree of standardization, but also 
recognized that the controversy it has generated might limit its success in this 
regard.78 
IV. GARY SCHWARTZ AND THE FORD PINTO 
Controversy about the design of the fuel-tank integrity system of the 
subcompact Ford Pinto began with a multi-million-dollar punitive damages award 
against the manufacturer/9 intensified as a result of an unsuccessful criminal 
prosecution of the company for recklessness in its design of the vehicle80 and 
regulatory initiatives by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA),81 and reached a high pitch by provoking an uproar in the mass media.82 
The dangers attributed to the Pinto's gas tank, which had a tendency to rupture and 
burst into flames when hit from behind, became symbolic of what critics saw as the 
evils of corporate cost-benefit decisionmaking, which traded lives for profit.83 
Gary made his way into this thicket and produced one of his [mest pieces.84 In 
his usual evenhanded way, which occasionally juxtaposed his criticisms ofpositions 
asserted on both sides of the tort-policy spectrum,85 he pointed out exaggerations 
78. See Federal Role, supra note 57, at 949-51. For a reiteration of these views about the 
Products Liability Restatement, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Nature of the New Restatement, 8 KAN.J.L. 
& PUB. POL'y 43 (1998). 
79. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal.Rptr. 348, 390-91 (1981) Gury verdict ofS125 
million in punitive damages against an automobile manufacturer reduced on appeal to $3.5 million). 
80. The trial is described at length in LEE PATRICK STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE?: FORD'S 
PINTO TRiAL (1980). 
81. For a summary, see Myth, supra note 6, at 1018 and John D. Graham, Product Liability and 
Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND 
INNOVATION 120 (peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds. 1991). 
82. The story came to public attention as a result of a Pulitzer-prize winning article. See Mark 
Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 18. The episode eventually inspired the 
motion picture Class Action. 
83. The verdict in Grimshaw assessed $125 million in punitive damages for what the jurors 
believed Ford had saved when it put offinstaIIing a safety feature that would have greatly increased 
the safety of the vehicle in rear-end collisions. See Connie Bruck, How Ford Stalled the Pinto 
Litigation, AM. LAW., June 1979, at 23,26. 
84. Myth, supra note 6. Gary had previously examined some of the issues raised by the awarding 
of punitive damages against Ford Motor Company for recklessness in designing the Pinto. See 
Deterrence, supra note 7, at 140-41, 149-52. 
85. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Mass Torts and Punitive Damages: A Comment, 39 VILL. L. 
REv. 415,421 (1994) (taking issue with argument that courts should not impose punitive damages on 
defendants who have been, or might be, found liable for compensatory damages to large numbers of 
victims); id. at 422 n.40 (pointing out the contradiction between claims in the same article to the effect 
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and distortions made by Ford's critics, yet he also found enough evidence to 
support a finding that the design of the Pinto's fuel system was unreasonably 
dangerous.86 Additionally, he addressed the troubling disconnect between, on the 
one hand, tort law's concept of reasonable care as exemplified by Judge Learned 
Hand's famous formula,87 and, on the other hand, the public's refusal to accept the 
notion that it might be reasonable to refuse to take safety precautions because of 
their cost, and, what is more, the \vi1lingness of juries to punish corporations that 
engage in this type of decisionmaking when they design products.88 
The first of the factual distortions pointed out by Gary concerned a Ford 
document that compared the costs of including a particular safety feature with the 
value of the deaths and injuries its installation might prevent. 89 The calculated safety 
benefit amounted to $49.5 million, while the cost of the design change was set at 
$137 million.90 Ford's critics treated the report as evidence of how the company 
made actual decisions when it designed the Pinto, and took particular umbrage at 
the use of a paltry $200,000 as the value of each life the alternative design would 
have saved.91 Gary demonstrated that Ford prepared the report for submission to 
NHTSA in opposition to a proposed safety standard aimed at preventing fuel 
leakage in the event of a vehicle rollover.92 Thus, it had nothing to do with the 
integrity of the fuel tank, which was "the actual focus of the Pinto brouhaha.93 
Moreover, he found that setting the value of a life at $200,000 at the time of the 
report's preparation was "within the range of expected and acceptable advocacy," 
that punitive damages are justifiable because the resources of federal and state law-enforcement 
agencies to initiate prosecutions are limited, and constitutional protections are not needed in punitive 
damages actions because of the absence of the reason why they are required in criminal cases, namely 
the substantial investigatory resources available to federal and state law-enforcement agencies); see 
also supra note 61. 
86. See Myth, supra note 6, at 1026-28. 
87. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (postulating a test 
for negligence under which it is not deemed unreasonable for an actor to forgo accident-prevention 
expenditures whose costs exceed the expected benefits they might bring, in the form of reduced 
deaths, injuries, and property damage). The risk-utility test for defective design reaches a similar 
conclusion. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 2(b). 
88. SeeMyth,supra note 6, at 1041. Gary also pointed out how ironic it was that Pinto owners 
probably engaged in the same type of cost-benefit decisionmaking (albeit for the most part 
subconsciously) when they received recall letters from Ford, since only fifty-three percent of them 
took advantage of the company's offer. Thus, as many as forty-seven percent may have reckoned that 
the costs of retaining the vehicle (which would include the risk of harm from a fuel-tank explosion 
and the temporary loss of use of the vehicle when they brought it to a dealer) outweighed the benefits 
they felt were to be gained from complying with the terms of the recall. See id. at 1042. 
89. See id. at 1020. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. at 1022. 
92. [d. at 1021. 
93. Indeed, the numbers Ford used reflected the total number of vehicles that the proposed 
regulation would affect, not just Pintos. 
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because it was the figure NHTSA itself had used in calculating safety benefits.94 
In addition, Gary took strong issue with the claims that Ford Pintos were 
"firetraps,,,95 and maintained that the basic design of the vehicle was not 
"inordinately dangerous" when compared to competitor subcompacts.96 Moreover, 
he demonstrated that the number of fatalities critics attributed to the Pinto's fuel 
system was exaggerated.97 
Having brought to light the misconceptions that had distorted the Pinto saga, 
Gary nonetheless concluded from the evidence taken as a whole that a reasonable 
person might have faulted Ford for not incorporating several features which would 
have cost $9 per vehicle, and would have improved the safety of the fuel tanks and 
would thereby have increased the chances of occupant survival in rear-end 
collisions; the company decided not to do so because of cost concerns.98 
The next part of Gary's article devoted itself to the apparent contradiction 
between risk-utility balancing, which one of the legal tests for defective design 
encourages manufacturers to do, and the public reaction against Ford's apparent 
prioritizing of profits over human lives.99 Here he made the key point that any 
savings generated by the failure to spend more on securing the fuel system enabled 
the company to keep the price of the Pintos down, so that more consumers could 
afford them; thus, any profits Ford might have realized came only as a result of 
increased sales. 100 
Gary also made an important contribution to our understanding of how popular 
distaste for the notion of corporate cost-benefit decisionmaking on matters of safety 
impacts on the trial of design-liability cases. Utilizing an investigative technique 
that enriched his scholarship from time to time and made it unique in a very 
important sense,IOI he elicited from defense attorneys a description of how they 
94. Myth, supra note 6, at 1025. It has always struck me that the value placed on each 
preventable injury-$67,000-was extraordinarily low, since severe bums can cause the sort of pain 
and suffering that can produce very substantial jury verdicts. 
95. See id. at 1026 (citing STUARTM. SPEISER, LAWSUIT 357 (1980)). 
96. Id. at 1028. See also DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 942 n.4 (3rd ed. 1996) ("In fairness to Ford, it should be noted that the Pinto gas tanks 
appear to have been no more hazardous that those of most other subcompacts at the time."). 
97. See Myth, supra note 6, at 1029-30. 
98. See id. at 1034-35. 
99. See id. at 1035-47. 
100. See id. at 1059 n.178. 
101. For other notable examples, see Understanding, supra note 5, at 450 (noting practitioners 
reported to Gary that "many juries seem puzzled, if not disturbed, by the very notion of strict 
liability"); id. at 469 (stating plaintiffs' attorneys expressed preference for ignoring burden-of-proof 
shift authorized by Barker when they have facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case of design 
defect under traditional risk-utility test); Beginning, supra note 7, at 630 n.138 (reporting that defense 
counsel find that roughly twenty-five percent of victims of general-aviation crashes file tort claims, 
as evidence of fallacy of claim by scholar that products liability law subjects general-aviation 
manufacturers to virtual absolute liability); id. at 688 (noting plaintiffs' lawyers description of 
litigation based on theory of market share liability as "nightmarish" because of high costs, 
uncertainties, and delays). 
HeinOnline -- 53 S. C. L. Rev. 813 2001-2002
2002] A VOICE OF REASON 813 
defend manufacturers in cases where plaintiffs claimed that conscious design 
choices rendered a product unreasonably dangerous. Theirtactics included stressing 
the loss of utility that would have resulted if the manufacturer had adopted the 
design alternative advocated by plaintiff, asserting that the product's design 
confonned to the state of the art, and alleging product misuse by plaintiff or a third 
person, causative negligence on the part of plaintiff or a third person, or plaintiff's 
assumption of a known or obvious risk; and they avoid at all cost any hint that 
financial considerations played any part in the design decision. lo2 
The Pinto case, however, did not turn on a weighing of risk-utility factors by 
the jury, since the trial judge rejected defendant's proposed risk-benefit instruction 
and let the case go to the jury under the consumer expectation test. I03 This led Gary 
to speculate whether the decision could usefully be interpreted as imposing de facto 
liability for failure to warn,I04 which one might infer from the jury's finding that the 
vehicle failed to meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer. The 
absence ofa warning about the risks generated by the design of the fuel-integrity 
system might have prevented plaintiff from making a fully infonned choice about 
whether to purchase the vehicle. Having suggested an inadequate-warnings 
approach for cases where manufacturers made conscious design choices about 
features affecting a product's safety, Gary proceeded to reject it, on the basis of a 
careful assessment of the difficulties a court would encounter in attempting to 
determine what infonnation a consumer would need in order to make an infonned 
choice about the purchase of an automobile, and whether supplying such 
infonnation was a cause-in-fact of the harm. IOS 
Gary then returned to the design-defect dilemma he had identified. As a 
possible solution, he brought back to the table the notion of genuine strict liability 
as an option, since it would eliminate the problem arising from the public's negative 
attitude about cost-benefit decision-making, but he reiterated his conviction that 
such an approach would impose liability too broadly.lo6 He then presented for 
consideration a compromise solution that would require plaintiffs to present 
evidence bearing on the risks of a product's existing design and the costs of 
reducing or eliminating them. The trialjudge would have the responsibility to direct 
a verdict for defendant if the design utilized by the manufacturer was clearly 
reasonable, but if reasonable minds might differ about whether the manufacturer 
should have used the alternative design, the judge should submit the case to the 
jury.I07 Gary did not explain, however, what kind of jury instruction would be 
Gary also did not hesitate to draw on his own real-life experiences to illustrate points he was 
making. See, e.g., id. at 644 n.204 (driving on the highway where an accident occurred giving rise to 
the opinion he was discussing); see also supra note 74. 
102. See Myth, supra note 6, at 1038. 
103. See id. at 1039-40. 
104. See id. at 1061-62. 
105. ld. at 1055. As an alternative, Gary suggested a NHTSA regulation that would require 
manufacturers to include safety information on stickers attached to new cars. See id. 
106. See id. at 1063-64; see supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text 
107. See Myth, supra note 6, at 1065-66. 
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appropriate. 108 
The Pinto article, in addition to underscoring Gary's abilities as a scholar, 
demonstrated another of his noteworthy qualities. The conflict between the Hand 
formula and the risk-utility test on the one hand and the public's attitudes toward 
corporate decisionmaking on the other might have suggested as a possible solution 
the removal of these kinds of cases fromjuries. However, Gary's comments reflect 
his appreciation of the value of maintaining a process that permits the community 
to have a voice in matters that affect the safety and health of the public. In this 
sense, he kept his feet on the ground and his eyes on the broader picture, and he 
directed his efforts toward reconciling the discrepancy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A retrospective examination of the entire body of Gary's products liability 
work ignites in the reader the sparkle of intellectual engagement in tandem with an 
appreciation that the shaping of ideas ought to include consideration of how they 
might play out in practice. In addition, it provokes a profound sense of sorrow at 
what we shall miss. Gary might not always have been right, 109 but he was never 
uninteresting and consistently challenging, and he made better scholars of us all. 
108. Gary might have considered how his approach compared with that adopted by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (pa. 1978), which 
approved an instruction to the effect that manufacturers were guarantors of the safety of their 
products. Id. at 1027. For an interpretation of Azzarello that offers interesting parallels to Gary's 
suggestion, see Ellen Wertheimer, Azzarello Agonistes: Bucking the Strict Products Liability Tide, 
66 TEMP. L. REv. 419 (1993). 
109. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, 
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 131, 132 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds. 1993) (writing that 
"tort law does not have a major role to play in the development of public policy for smoking in the 
1990s," proving the hazard of making predictions). On the contribution of information about tobacco 
unearthed during product liability litigation to the development of regulatory policy by the Food and 
Drug Administration, see Margaret Gilhooley, Tobacco Unregulated: Why the FDA Failed and What 
To Do Now, 111 YALE L.J. 1179, 1187 (2002). 
